Abstract-Devices in a Mobile Ad Hoc network (MANET) may misbehave by dropping packets that are forwarded in the network, for example because they are malicious and deliberately intend to disrupt the network, or because they are selfish and wish to conserve their own limited resources such as power. In this paper, we present a mechanism that enables the detection of nodes that exhibit packet forwarding misbehavior. We present initial evaluation results that demonstrate the operation of our algorithm and show that it effectively detects nodes that drop a significant fraction of packets.
INTRODUCTION
The wireless nature and inherent features of mobile ad hoc networks make them vulnerable to a wide variety of attacks by misbehaving nodes. Such attacks range from passive eavesdropping, where a node tries to obtain unauthorized access to data destined for another node, to active interference where malicious nodes hinder network performance by not obeying globally acceptable rules. Misbehavior can be divided into two categories [1] : routing misbehavior (failure to behave in accordance with a routing protocol) and packet forwarding misbehavior (failure to correctly forward data packets in accordance with a data transfer protocol). In this paper we focus on the latter type of misbehavior. Our approach consists of an algorithm that enables packet forwarding misbehavior detection through the principle offlow conservation [3] . Our scheme is not tightly coupled to any specific routing protocol and, therefore, it can operate regardless of the routing strategy adopted. Our criterion for judging a node is the estimated percentage of packets dropped, which is compared against a pre-established misbehavior threshold. Any node dropping packets in excess of this threshold is deemed a misbehaving node while those below the threshold are considered to be correctly behaving.
In this paper we first present a framework and an algorithm and protocol that deal with this attack. We then demonstrate through simulations that an appropriate selection of the misbehavior threshold allows for a good discrimination between misbehaved and well-behaved nodes in a network that is affected by black hole attacks, where malicious nodes drop all packets they receive, and/or gray hole attacks, where they drop packets selectively or in a probabilistic manner in an attempt to circumvent the security measures in place.
Section II of this paper describes our algorithm for packet forwarding misbehavior detection, and Section III presents an initial performance evaluation. Finally, the paper is summarized in Section IV.
II. DETECTING PACKET FORWARDING MISBEHAVIOR
Our work provides a novel approach to securing the data forwarding functionality in mobile ad hoc networks. We propose an approach that takes advantage of the principle of flow conservation in a network. This states that all bytes/packets sent to a node, and not destined for that node, are expected to exit the node. In this Section we first present, from a theoretical point of view, how this principle works assuming it is implemented in an ideal network, and then we demonstrate that by making some reasonable assumptions and adaptations, our algorithm can cope with the practical problems that are encountered in real M\ANETs. the conservation of flow principle means that we are not susceptible to problems that arise when overhearing other nodes' transmissions. Thus, problems such as ambiguous collisions, receiver collisions, and the ability of a node to control its transmission power, which affect the approaches proposed in [1] and [2] , do not exist in our approach.
Ambiguous collisions occur when a node v1 is trying to determine if another node v2 is properly forwarding a packet. It may happen that node v2 forwards the packet to a further node V3, which is out of the transmission range of vl, while a second transmission prevents v1 from overhearing the forwarded packet, thus v1 will not know if the packet was forwarded. On the other hand, in the receiver collision problem v2 forwards the packet to V3 at which point a collision occurs. Node v1 is unaware of such a collision and assumes that the packet was forwarded even if v2 does not attempt a retransmission. Another common problem is caused by nodes capable of controlling their transmission power. Thus, v2 can transmit with enough power for v1to overhear but not enough power for V3 to receive it, leaving v2 unaware of the situation. All these weaknesses, which can be used by malicious nodes to disrupt the network, are due to the fact that overhearing is used by nodes to check for misbehavior in other nodes. In our algorithm the nodes that maintain statistics that are used to determine whether the forwarding was properly made are the nodes actively involved in the transmission process, i.e. the transmitter and the receiver of each transmission.
However, a node may exhibit malicious behavior even if it is not purposefully doing so. For example, an overloaded node may temporarily lack the CPU cycles, buffer space or bandwidth to forward packets [2] . In addition, some reactive routing protocols, e.g. AODV, cause buffered packets to be dropped if they go through a path that is even temporarily unavailable. For these reasons equation (1) cannot be applied in a rigorous manner and a threshold needs to be established to account for packets dropped by a node through no fault of its own. Equation (2) reflects this change: (2) (I -ahreshold ) E Ri )< Ei,b All nodes in the network continuously monitor their neighbors and update the list of those they have heard recently (Fig. 1 .a) . If the ID of an overheard node is not included in the table of overheard nodes a new entry is created. Otherwise, the existing entry is updated with a timestamp corresponding to the time the node was last overheard. Upon the creation of a new entry, a node schedules a task/event to check the behavior of the node whose ID has been saved in the new entry. Nodes randomly select a period of time between T , and Tmax to schedule the behavior checking task. This random selection seeks to reduce the possibility of two or more nodes starting a behavior check on the same node at the same time, wasting network bandwidth, battery energy and other network resources.
When a scheduled task is triggered in node Vk to check vy's behavior ( Fig. 1.b Figure   2 coming in contact with nodes v14, v17, v18, v19, v20, v23, v24 and v25. It finally stops in position b. In the Figure the scheduled behavior check initiation task (Fig. l.b) in v8 is the first to be triggered and the limited broadcast commences. All nodes that have overheard node V7 re-broadcast the MIREQ, whereas nodes such as v4, vg and v15 also receive the MIREQ but ignore it because they have not overheard node V7. The handling of requests (Fig. l.c) is the heart of our limited broadcast algorithm. When a node receives an MREQ it first checks if the CHK ID is in its table of overheard nodes; if it is not the node ignores the MREQ and discards the check. However, if the CHK ID appears in its table then it rebroadcasts the MREQ with TTL = 1 in the IP header. Setting the TTL to one allows our algorithm to control how far the Once a node has decided whether to continue or not broadcasting a MREQ, it reschedules any pending task to check the behavior of the checked node specified in the CHK ID field of the MREQ. The new behavior checking task is scheduled in the same way as when a new entry is made in the table of overheard nodes, i.e. a period of time is randomly selected between T and Tmax. In this way if the random selection is uniformly distributed and the average frequency with which an active node's behavior is checked is:
checked. If any of the metrics has a value other than zero the node returns a metrics reply packet (MIREP) (Fig. l.c) containing the metrics, but if the value of both metrics is zero then the node does not send back any response. In our scheme the task of finding a route back to the node that originated the MREQ has been left to the underlying routing protocol.
Reply handling is executed in the node that initiated the MREQ. This node, v8 in Fig. 2 , waits for a period of time in order to give all nodes with metrics about the checked node the opportunity of replying. When the time expires, the node checks the behavior of the analyzed node by verifying that equation (2) holds (Fig. l.d) . If it does not, it flags the checked node as a misbehaving one; this is a detection. Using a single detection to accuse a node is not sufficient since such an algorithm may lead to false accusations against correctly behaving nodes. A scheme in which multiple detections by different nodes are necessary to accuse a node is fairer to wellbehaved nodes, while keeping a high probability of correctly accusing misbehaving nodes. Thus, a system whose goal is to accuse misbehaving nodes, perhaps in order to punish them by withdrawing their right to transmit on the network, could use an approach similar to the distributed consensus mechanism proposed in SCAN [1] .
III. EVALUATION
We perform our simulations using the GloMoSim simulation package. The results presented for each value are the average of 5 The pause time takes a value that is exponentially distributed with mean 30 seconds, v) the wireless transmission range of every node is 100 meters, vi) the link capacity is 2 Mbps, vii) the MAC layer protocol is the IEEE 802.11 DCF, viii) the underlying routing protocol is AODV, and ix) the total simulation time for each scenario is 300 seconds. The network was set-up with 25% of nodes misbehaving by not forwarding all packets. Nodes check the behavior of active nodes within a period chosen uniformly between 15 and 30 seconds, and keep any overheard node in their tables for 60 seconds after the last time they are heard. The principal metric in our tests is the percentage of detections, which is assessed in terms of misbehavior threshold.
We consider the precision of our misbehavior detection algorithm in terms of the misbehavior threshold, which is the parameter°Chreshold in equation (2), i.e. the maximum percentage of packets that a node is allowed to drop without being detected as a misbehaving node. In order to see properly the effect of the misbehavior threshold on nodes, simulations were carried out with nodes dropping packets with probabilities of 0%, 10%, 20%, 50% and 700O while the misbehavior threshold was varied from 00/ to 100%. Figure 3 depicts the percentage of detections as a function of the misbehavior threshold for nodes exhibiting different probabilities of misbehavior. It can be inferred from the graph that the criterion to select an adequate misbehavior threshold depends on the level oftrust required in the network. The lower the threshold is the more packets nodes need to forward to be considered well-behaved. However, since characteristics inherent to MANETs such as mobility and the noisy wireless medium can cause some packets to be lost (including packets of our own protocol), it also means that an increasing number of correctly behaving nodes can be falsely detected as misbehaving ones. Finally, it can also be seen from Fig. 3 that selecting a misbehavior threshold equal to a node's misbehaving probability prevents our approach from identifying misbehaving nodes with certainty, i.e. the probability of detection is approximately 50%. These occurrences are all contained in the zone between 400/ and 60% probability of detection in the figure. 
IV. SUMMARY
In this paper we have presented an algorithm that is capable of detecting packet forwarding misbehavior. The algorithm does not require high density networks in which many nodes can overhear each others' received and transmitted packets, but instead uses statistics accumulated by each node as it transmits to and receives data from its neighbors.
